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Reaching Out to the Unbanked
John P. Caskey

This chapter presents a strategy for helping the "unbanked"—those who
do not have deposit accounts of any t5^e—to join the financial mainstream.
The purpose is to help these individuals build savings and improve their
credit-risk profiles, in order to lower their cost of payment services, elimi
nate a common source of stress, and gain access to lower-cost mainstream
credit. The proposed strategy has five elements. First, participating banks
should open special branch offices, called "outlets," that are conveniently
located for lower-income households and that provide fee-based, check
cashing services in addition to traditional consumer banking services.
Second, these outlets should offer "starter" bank accounts that have low
minimum-balance requirements, carmotbe overdrawn, and include access
to low-cost money orders for making long-distance payments.' Third, the
outlets should offer accounts, similar to traditional "Christmas Club"
accounts, designed to help people accumulate savings. Fourth, the outlets
should offer deposit-secured loans to individuals whose credit histories
would make them ineligible for mainstream credit. Fifth, banks should
form partnerships with nonprofit community-based organizations to help
promote the outlets and to offer budget-management and credit-repair
seminars to interested clients of the outlets.
This chapter argues that a strategic approach is likely to be most effec
tive in assisting the unbanked and, furthermore, that it is realistic to expect
many banks to implement it. The proposed initiative will appeal to banks
because it can be effective for the clients, while offering banks a reasonable
rate of return on their investments. In addition, banks that implement the
strategy can receive credit toward the "service" component of their federal
Community Reinvestment Act obligations.
The section below describes people who are unbanked, noting their
demographic characteristics, why they decide to remain outside the bank
ing system, and the problems they face as a result of their status. The next
section presents my strategy for bringing the imbanked into the financial
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mainstream and explains the rationale for the strategy. And in the final sec
tion, 1 explain why it is realistic to expect banks to implement the strategy.

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE UNBANKED

Several surveys have attempted to identify the socioeconomic characteris
tics of households without bank accoimts and to ask individuals in these
households why they do not have bank accoimts. Although the details of
these surveys differ, they all find that the imbanked are disproportionately
represented among lower-income households, among households headed
by African Americans and Hispanics, among households headed by young
adults, and among householders who rent their homes. Table 8.1, based on
data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, presents data supporting
such generalizations.
The second issue that the surveys attempt to answer is why people do
not have deposit accounts. Again, the details differ across the surveys, but
there is a broad consensus in their findings. Families most frequently report
that they do not have deposit accoimts because they have almost no monthto-month financial savings to keep in the accounts. In 1996, a consulting firm
working for the U.S. Department of the Treasury surveyed a large sample
of recipients of federal benefit checks to inquire why they did not have
deposit accounts (Booz-Allen, 1997). About half of the respondents cited as
the primary reason, "Don't have enough money." In the same year, 1996,1
commissioned a survey of 900 lower-income households to obtain infor
mation on their use of financial services (Caskey, 1997b). Of those without
accounts, as shown in table 8.2, 53 percent cited, "Don't need account
because we have no savings," which made this the most frequently cited
reason.^ Unfortunately, the Survey of Consumer Finances does not ask people
why they do not have deposit accounts. Rather, it asks households without
checking accounts to give the primary reason why they do not have a check
ing account. As shown in table 8.3, the most common (28.6 percent) reason
cited is "Do not write enough checks to make it worthwhile." "Do not have
enough money" is the third most common (14 percent) response.
In the surveys, other common responses for why people do not have
deposit accounts include "Bank fees are too high," "Bank minimum balance
requirements are too high," "We want to keep our financial records pri
vate," and "We are not comfortable dealing with a bank." The first two of
these reasons are closely related to people's low level of financial savings,
as depositors able to maintain a month-to-month balance of about $500 or
more rarely pay account maintenance fees and rarely write checks that
"bounce," leading to nonsufficient funds fees. The desire to keep financial
records private could arise because (a) a creditor might seize the savings of
a delinquent debtor, (b) a former spouse might pursue the savings of an
individual behind on his child-support payments, (c) welfare eligibility
could be threatened by a substantial account balance or by a history of
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Table 8.1 Percentage of Families without Deposit Accounts, 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
Family Characteristic

All families

Percentage without Deposit Account

9.1

Percentile of income
Less than 20

29.1

20-39.9

10.6

40-59.9

3.9

60-79.9

1.2

80-89.9

0.3

90-100

0.8

Age of head (years)
Less than 35

14.0

35-44

9.3

45-54

7.8

55-64

6.4

65-74

6.2

75 or more

6.3

Race or ethnicity of respondent
Nonwhite or Hispanic
White non-Hispanic

21.8
5.1

Current work status of head
Working for someone else

7.6

Self-employed

4.8

Retired

11.1

Other, not working

29.5

Housing status
Owner
Renter or other

3.5
20.7

Source: Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore, 2003.

deposits from imder-the-table earnings, or (d) illegal immigrants might fear
that a bank record would reveal their presence to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The formal surveys have not delved into these rea
sons, but one ethnographic study finds evidence of these concerns even, in
some cases, when there is little legitimate basis for the concerns (Caskey,
1997a). Less common reasons given for not having a deposit account
include, "Banks won't let us open an accoimt" (presumably because the per-
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Table 8.2 Reasons Given in Caskey Survey for Why Households Do Not Have Deposit Accounts
Reason/Reasons Given

Percentage Giving This Reason

Don't need account because I have no savings

53.3

Bank account fees are too high

23.1

Banks require too much money just to open an account

22.1

I want to keep my financial records private

21.6

Not comfortable dealing with banks

17.6

Banks won't let us open an account

9.5

No bank has convenient hours of location

8.5

Problem fee/fees among those citing bank fees as a barrier
Monthly account maintenance fee

28.4

Bounced-check fees

18.5

Check-writing fees

12.9

ATM fees

11.0

Source: Caskey, 1997b.

son has a history of writing bad checks or a severely impaired credit record)
and, "No bank has convenient hours or location."
Many of the unbanked encounter few problems from their status
(Prescott and Tatar, 1999). They have no financial savings, so there is no
hardship from not having access to a financial institution to safeguard such
savings. They cash paychecks for free at an accoimnodating deposit instiTable 8.3 Primary Reasons in 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances for Why Households
Do Not Have Checking Accounts
Reason

Percentage Giving This Reason

Do not write enough checks to make it worthwhile

28.6

Do not like dealing with banks

22.6

Do not have enough money

14.0

Service charges are too high

10.2

Minimum balance is too high

6.5

Carmot manage or balance a checking account

6.6

Do not need/want an account

5.3

Credit problems

3.6
0.4

;
1

2.1

1

No bank has convenient hours or location
Other

Source: Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore, 2003.
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tution, grocery store, or other business. They purchase money orders from
the post office or convenience stores to pay bills by mail. They have no
immediate need for credit or do not find that their imbanked status excludes
them from the credit that they do need.
Such a sanguine outlook is not, however, true for a significant fraction
of the imbanked. In urban areas, surveys indicate that somewhere between
30 and 60 percent of the unbanked pay fees to cash their paychecks, and
many of these patronize commercial check-cashing outlets, called CCOs
(Caskey, 2002). CCOs cash people's paychecks or government checks for a
fee that is usually expressed as a percentage of the face value of the check.
Except in a small number of states that impose fee ceilings below 2 percent,
typical fees for cashing low-risk checks range from 2 to 4 percent. Some
CCOs will cash personal checks, usually for a higher fee to reflect the
higher risk that such checks might bounce. CCOs also sell money orders,
handle utility bill payments, serve as agents for firms that transfer money
electronically, and sell related convenience items, such as photocopying
services and prepaid calling cards.
The problem created by the regular use of a CCO is that CCOs are an
expensive source for payment services. Over the course of a year, a family
making $18,000 a year can easily spend $500 or more of this limited income
obtaining basic payment services at a CCO. Nevertheless, there is little mys
tery as to why many individuals without financial savings go to a CCO. The
CCO will cash their paychecks instantly. While standing at the service win
dow, the customers can use some of the cash to purchase money orders for
paying bills. The CCO also sells stamps and envelopes for mailing the pay
ments. CCO customers will frequently use some of their cash to pay utility
bills, cable television bills, and phone bills at the CCO. In commimities with
large numbers of recent immigrants, many CCO customers wire some of
their funds to family members in home countries. After conducting these
transactions, the customers walk out of the CCO with their remaining
cash. They spend this down until the next pay period when they repeat
this procedure.
Given this behavioral pattern, it is imderstandable why such customers
do not go to a bank. Most banks in urban areas refuse to cash paychecks for
people who do not have accounts at the bank or who do not have accounts
with sufficient funds to cover the check. Banks typically require accoimt
holders without sufficient funds to deposit the check and wait a few days
for it to clear before they gain access to the funds. Although the CCO
charges fees for cashing a paycheck (a percentage of the amount), a money
order (generally about $0.35 to $1), or transmitting a utility bill payment
(commonly about $1), this can be less costly for someone with no monthto-month savings than relying on a bank. It is very easy for a person who
nms his account balance down to nearly zero at the end of each pay period
to bounce checks on the account. Each boimced check can cost the account
holder $25 to $35.^ It is also expensive and inconvenient for customers
without checking accounts to make long-distance payments. Almost all
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banks charge at least $1 for money orders, and many charge as much as $3.
Moreover, they do not sell stamps and envelopes, so the customer must go
elsewhere to meet this need. Finally, banks generally do not transmit pay
ments to utility companies, nor do they serve as agents for electronic money
transfer services, such as Western Union.
Although most attention has gone to the relatively high fees that many
of the embanked incur for basic payment services, this may not be the major
problem associated with their status. In 1997, in collaboration with a group
of anthropologists, I conducted a series of detailed discussions with lowerincome individuals, many of whom were unbanked, in two communities,
San Jose, California, and a small town in Mississippi (Caskey, 1997a). In dis
cussing their financial affairs, the embanked rarely complained about the
expense or inconvenience of obtaining payment services. Rather, they com
plained mainly about the insecurity and stress associated with living from
paycheck to paycheck. This was also true of individuals with bank accounts
who consistently ran down their account balances to nearly zero at the end
of each pay period. In both cases, the interviewed individuals commonly
spoke of feeling physically and emotionally drained from facing frequent
personal financial crises and worrying about future unforeseen expenses.
Because so many of the unbanked live from paycheck to paycheck with
no financial margin of safety, many have been forced by past personal
financial crises to miss scheduled payment obligations, such as rental, debt
service, or utility bill payments. In my 1997 survey of 900 lower-income
families, for example, 42 percent of the families without deposit accounts
reported that they had been two months late on some bills in the previous
year (see table 8.4). Among lower-income families with deposit accovmts,
28 percent reported being late paying some bills in the previous year.
Similarly, 41 percent of the unbanked families and 25 percent of lowerincome families with deposit accounts reported that they had been con
tacted by a bill collection agency in the past year.

Table 8.4 Indicators of Impaired Credit Records among Households with Incomes
of $25,000 or Less
% Families without
Deposit Accounts
Answering “Yes”

% Families with
Deposit Accounts
Answering “Yes”

Difference Is
Statistically
Significant?

Been more than 2 months late
on some bills in the past year?

41.9

28.2

Yes

Contacted by a bill collection
agency in past year?

40.9

24.8

Yes

Have a Visa, MasterCard,
Discover, or Optima credit card?

13.6

58.7

Yes

Indicator

Source: Survey conducted as part of Caskey, 1997b.

Reaching Out to the Unbanked

155

These data indicate that the unbanked are more likely to have impaired
credit records than those in households with bank accounts. But they also
indicate that problems with credit histories and debt service burdens are
widespread among lower-income households generally, including those
with bank accoimts. As indicated in table 8.5, this impression is supported
by data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Problems with credit histories and debt-service burdens leave a large
share of the unbanked, as well as a significant share of lower-income house
holds generally, cut off from mainstream credit.^ When these households
need short-term loans to meet emergencies, they find informal sources of
credit or turn to high-cost, formal-sector lenders, such as pawnshops, car
title lenders, payday lenders, and small-loan companies. Interest rates from
these lenders are generally over 100 percent average percentage rate (APR)
and often as high as 300 percent (Caskey, 1997b).
PROPOSED OUTREACH STRATEGY

This section sets out a strategy for bringing the embanked into the financial
mainstream. As noted earlier, the strategy has five elements, the details of
which will be presented below. First, however, it should be emphasized that
while the overall proposal is new, it embeds several other initiatives with
similar goals that are already under way. For example, the proposed strat
egy includes efforts to design accessible, low-cost deposit accoimts, to create
institutional mechanisms that facilitate people's efforts to accumulate sav
ings, and to increase financial literacy within lower-income communities.
Open Specialized Bank Branches That Provide CCO Services

The first step in the proposed strategy is for banks to open specialized
branches that offer a full range of CCO services, as well as standard conTable 8.5 Indicators of Debt Burdens and Debt Payment Difficulties
% with Ratio of Debt
Payments to Family
Income above 40 Percent

% with a Debt Payment
Late 60 Days or More
in Previous Year

All families
Income (1998 dollars)

12.7

8.1

Less than 10,000

32.0

15.1

10,000-24,999

19.9

12.3

25,000^9,999

13.8

9.2

50,000-99,999

5.7

4.5

100,000 or more

2.1

1.5

Family Characteristic

Source: Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette, 2000.
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sximer banking services. To distinguish them from other bank branches, I call
these specialized bank branches "outlets." An alternative approach would
be for banks to form partnerships with existing check-cashing outlets and to
offer basic consumer banking services through these outlets. For simplicity,
the discussion below assumes that banks are opening their own outlets, but
it could easily be adapted to fit a model based on a bank/CCO joint venture.
For an appropriate fee, the new bank outlets should cash low-risk local
paychecks and government checks without placing a hold on the checks,
even for individuals who lack deposits to cover the checks.^ As people
without checking accounts who cash their paychecks will need a means to
pay bills, these outlets should sell money orders, stamps, and envelopes,
and they should serve as an in-person payment point for utility bills, cable
TV bills, and so on. They should also offer a service for transferring funds
by wire, especially when the outlets are located in areas with large num
bers of recent immigrants. Additionally, when unbanked people cash paychecks and pay bills, they frequently need to obtain convenience items and
services such as photocopies, fax transmissions, prepaid telephone calling
cards, and, in some regions, transit tokens. The outlets should provide such
supporting products and services—in fact, the outlets would perform all
CCO-type services but charge somewhat lower fees for all products and
services than charged by the CCOs.
If the outlets are to be successful, banks must locate them at points likely
to be convenient for large numbers of low- and moderate-income house
holds. The outlets will need to maintain hours similar to those of check
cashing outlets, meaning that they should be open early evenings and on
Saturdays. Banks should also post prominent signage indicating that the
outlets offer check-cashing services. In many cases, giving the outlets a
CCO-t5q>e name, such as "Cash Express Center of Bank X," will serve this
purpose. It also distinguishes the outlets from a bank's regular branches
that do not offer check-cashing services to those without deposit accounts.
Opening such outlets serves three purposes. First, by offering CCO
services in a bank branch, the bank establishes direct contact with CCO cus
tomers. Over time, banks can develop relationships with unbanked indi
viduals that they can use to encourage them to take steps to build savings
and address credit record problems. Simply put, banks cannot help the
unbanked if they do not get them in the door. Second, the establishment of
such outlets recognizes that many CCO customers are likely to be slow to
open deposit accoimts. As noted earlier, many simply do not have monthto-month savings and see little advantage to a deposit account. Others do
not want deposit accounts for fear that their savings might be seized by cred
itors or might make them ineligible for welfare. By offering check-cashing
services, banks can provide high-quality, relatively low-cost payment ser
vices to individuals who remain outside the deposit system. Tfurd, banks
with branches in lower-income areas often report that it is difficult to cover
the costs of these branches with traditional services because deposit mobi
lization is low, transaction levels are high, and loan opportunities are lim-
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ited (Caskey and Humphrey, 1999). If these branches were able to find new
sources of revenue, such as check-cashing fees, this could contribute toward
making these branches profitable and encourage banks to open branches
likely to attract large percentages of lower-income households.
Banks opening such outlets may be able to set fees for check-cashing
services that are somewhat lower than those of most commercial check
cashing outlets and yet sufficiently high to be profitable for the banks. This
is true for two reasons. First, bank outlets, which will offer traditional con
sumer banking services as well as check-cashing services, should benefit
from economies of scope. Earnings from both services can cover many of the
same fixed overhead expenses. Second, banks, unlike commercial check
cashing outlets, have direct access to check-clearing systems and have a
relatively low cost of financial capital. This will eliminate some of the costs
that check-cashers incur from the need to clear checks through the banking
system and obtain working capital.
Offer “Starter” Bank Accounts That Have Low Minimum-Balance Requirements,
Cannot Be Overdrawn, and Include Access to Low-Cost Money Orders
for Making Long-Distance Payments

In addition to offering traditional, fee-based check-cashing services, these
specialized outlets should provide the full range of consumer banking ser
vices offered at banks' traditional branches. This recognizes that even in
very low-income communities, there will be significant numbers of people
who desire traditional deposit and credit services and can qualify for them.
To the extent that outlets can attract such customers, they will make bank
ing services more convenient for some community members and help to
cover the costs of operating the outlets. In addition, because the outlets are
intended to help the unbanked become traditional bank customers, it will
be helpful to have banking services offered in locations where unbanked
individuals are already comfortable.
Beyond their traditional deposit accounts, the outlets should offer a lowcost, low-minimum-balance savings account, and account holders should
be able to purchase at least ten money orders per month for no more than
$0.75 each, as well as stamped envelopes for mailing the money orders.
For qualifying households, the account should include automated teller
machine (ATM) and debit-card access. If banks are able to block individ
uals' abilities to overdraw their accounts, then banks should be able to
provide ATM access even to householders with severely impaired credit
histories. Finally, the accounts should accept electronic deposits of wage
payments and government transfers.
The proposed features of this t3rpe of accoimt differ from those of two
other prominent accounts that have been advocated as mechanisms to help
the unbanked join the banking system. A number of advocates for the
unbanked have sought to enact laws, called "basic" or "lifeline" banking
laws, that would require banks to offer a low-cost checking account with a
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low minimum-balance requirement. A small number of states have enacted
such laws, but the federal government has not. Altitough bank trade asso
ciations fought against such proposed laws, especially at the federal ev ,
they caUed L banks to offer such accounts voluntarily. A majority of ba^s
claim that they do (Krieger, 2000). In a second imhahve, begmnmg m 1999,
S.rDepaLent of fhe Treasury asked banks to offer "dectronic trans
action accounts" (ETAs). The federal government wants banks to offer these
accounts in order to encourage the use of direct deposit by unbanked recip
ients of federal transfer payments. Currently, the government must mail
paper checks to individuals who do not have deposit accounts^In des gn
ing the ETA, the government had two concerns. First, it wante o ^^s^e
thft the account was inexpensive for account owners, evei^or ^^mdua s
unable to maintain a month-to-month minimum balance, ^ns was to pro
vide the unbanked an incentive to open an ETA, makmg them eligible fo
direct deposit. Second, the government wanted the
moderately profitable for banks so that they would be
To meet these two goals, the government offers to pay banks $12.60 for ea
ETA they open. It permits the banks to charge account owners up to $3 a
month and requires that the accounts accept electronic payments fmm *e
federal government, have no minimum balance requirement, and per
account owners to make up to four withdrawals per month from tbe accoimt
The withdrawals can be from a proprietary ATM machine or throug
teller. The accounts need not include the ability to draw checks on them or
the ability to initiate electronic payments.®
There are good reasons to think that basic checkmg accounts and ETAs
are unlikely to bring many of the unbanked mto the banlang system,
checking account can be very costly for someone who lives from paycheck
to paycheck. Individuals who consistently run down their
to zero or nearly zero by the end of each pay period are likely to bounce
checks frequently unless they are especiaUy
“^I/OWriting a check that bounces commonly results m fees of $25 to $35, so peo
pie who bounce a few checks every other month or so will quickly spend
more for their bank accounts than they would for usmg a
let In addition, because banks fear that people who bounce chec^ migW
not pay the fees that banks charge to cover the banks costs of h^lmg die
chedcs! they generally do not permit people with histories of bouncmg
checks to open or maintain checking accounts.

Low-cost deposit accounts on which individuals cannot wnte checks,
such as the ETA, have a different problem. These accounts do not mclu
any means for account holders to make long-distance payments Since most
S charge comparatively high fees for money orders, do not seU stamps
ajSntKJes, Jd do no. haU udlity bill payment, account hold«s
have to go elsewhere to obtain these services, a feature that makes the ETA
"^Unfort^ately, there are no data indicating whether
ing accounts have drawn significant numbers of the unbanked into the
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banking system (Doyle, Lopez, and Saidenberg, 1999). Anecdotal infor
mation suggests that they have not. Complicating the analysis, however,
several surveys of banks in states requiring basic checking accounts have
foimd that banks do not publicize these accounts and frequently steer cus
tomers to more costly alternative accounts (Pristin, 1999). Such behavior is
not surprising, as banks claim that the accounts are improfitable. The ETA
has also failed to have a significant impact. As the U.S. General Accounting
Office (2002, 25) reported, "Despite Treasury's efforts to market the ETA
program, since the program was initiated in July 1999, about 36,000, or
fewer than 1 percent, of unbanked federal beneficiaries had opened ETAs
by June 2002."
The account that I propose has two advantages over the basic checking
accovmt and the ETA. For one, banks can offer it to people who have a his
tory of bouncing checks, and people who fear the expense associated with
bounced checks will not be deterred from opening the account. In addition,
unlike the ETA, it provides account holders with a convenient, low-cost
means to make long-distance payments: inexpensive money orders with
stamped envelopes. If they desire, banks can design the proposed account
to qualify as an "electronic transfer account" in order to receive the $12.60
that the Treasury Department pays for each ETA that banks open.
Offer Accounts Specifically Designed to Help People Build Savings

In addition to the savings account described above, the outlets should offer
a "savings-building" account. Although there can be many variations in
the details of savings-building accounts, research on consumers' savings
behavior indicates that these accounts should have several key features.
First, in opening such an account, an individual should pledge to make reg
ular, fixed-value contributions to the account over a specified time period,
usually one year. The timing of these contributions should closely coincide
with the individual's receipts of income. Second, the bank should permit
the required periodic contributions to be small, perhaps as little as $20 per
month. Third, if possible, contributions to the account should be automatic.
The contributions, for example, could be linked to a member's direct deposit
of his or her salary, or a check-cashing customer might agree to deposit $10
each time he cashes his biweekly paychecks. Fourth, a savings-building
account should be separate from other accounts that the individual might
own. This helps separate the funds psychologically from savings for short
term transaction purposes. Finally, there should be some financial penalty
if the account owner closes the account early or fails to keep the commit
ment to make specified deposits at regular intervals. In imposing this
penalty, such as loss of accumulated interest, the bank should probably
show some flexibility. It might, for example, permit one or two missed
deposits before the penalty takes effect.
The psychological basis of these rules is obvious. People have a hard
time saving on a discretionary basis, so they save most effectively when the
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act of saving is relatively unconscious and the savings are viewed as
"locked away" (Thaler, 1992).
This proposed savings-building account is similar in several of its features
to the individual development accounts (IDAs) that some banks and credit
unions have begun to offer in partnership with philanthropic foimdations,
community-based organizations, or government agencies. There are, how
ever, two main differences. The IDAs offer matching funds to lower-income
individuals who accumulate and maintain savings over a designated period
of time. In addition, holders of IDAs, if they are to receive the matching
funds, must use their IDA savings for an approved set of purposes, such as
education or the down pa5nnent on a home.
When matching funds are available and administrative costs are not a
problem, the outlets might consider offering IDAs in addition to the savingsbuilding account advocated above. The IDA should not, however, replace
the savings-building account. For one, the savings-building account is
administratively simpler and has lower costs, making it more likely that
banks will offer it. A bank can offer it to anyone and need not verify that
an account holder has a sufficiently low income to qualify. The savingsbuilding accoimt also does not require the bank to find a source to provide
matching deposits. More important, IDAs are intended to help people
build medium- or long-term savings for a particular set of approved pur
poses. People living from paycheck to paycheck would benefit from such
savings, but they also need short-term savings to dip into to handle peri
odic fluctuations in income and expenditures. Such short-term savings are
a form of self-insurance, a financial margin of safety or "buffer" intended
to prevent periodic personal financial crises.
Offer Deposit-Secured Emergency Loans to Individuals Whose Credit Histories
Make Them Ineligible for Traditional Mainstream Credit

Although bank outlets can compete with commercial check-cashers, in most
cases they will not be able to provide traditional loans to people currently
borrowing from deeply subprime lenders, such as pawnshops, payday
lenders, and small loan companies. These people generally have far higher
risk profiles than would be prudent for depository institutions to under
write. The deeply subprime lenders can provide credit to this population
group by adopting labor-intensive risk-control procedures, such as prompt
and persistent in-person debt collection. The outlets could try to follow a
similar path, but pawnbroking and collecting unsecured subprime debt are
specialized skills that bank outlet employees are imlikely to possess or
would not choose to develop. In many cases, it is doubtful that a bank outlet
would be providing a beneficial service if it were to make short-term, highcost loans to financially hard-pressed individuals. This could simply worsen
the borrowers' financial distress and the costs of the resulting consequences.
In some cases, however, bank outlets should be able to use creative
means to meet customers' legitimate credit needs. Banks with branches in
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lower-income communities frequently report that many of their customers
with good credit records occasionally seek imsecured, nonrevolving loans
of under $1,000. Commonly, banks do not offer such loans because the pro
cessing and monitoring costs are high relative to the size of the loan. But
with credit-scoring and other cost-saving technologies, the outlets may be
able to make fast-disbursing, small-value loans with fees that are attractive
to both the customers and the banks.
Customers with impaired credit histories will also have legitimate needs
for credit. To help meet this need, the outlets should offer deposit-secured
loans to customers imable to pass standard credit-risk assessments. An out
let could, for example, issue a deposit-secured credit card to a customer. Or
it could make a loan against the balance that a member has accumulated in
a savings-building account. When the customer repays the loan, his or her
savings are still in place. Moreover, if outlets offer such loans, customers
may be more likely to agree to lock away their savings in savings-building
accounts (Caskey and Humphrey, 1999).
Seek Community-Based Partners and Offer Financial Literacy Programs

As the previous example makes clear, banks can benefit by forming part
nerships with not-for-profit community-based organizations (CBOs) when
launching outlets to serve the unbanked. Of course, in doing so, banks must
tread carefully. Just because an organization is not-for-profit or declares itself
to be "commimity-based" does not mean that it will be a good partner. Some
CBOs operate primarily to promote the personal political or economic
ambitions of their executives, some are well-meaning but incompetent, and
others have severe shortages of human and financial resources. In most large
urban areas, however, there are numerous well-managed CBOs dedicated
to helping lower-income individuals and communities.
A partnership with an appropriate CBO can bring a number of benefits
to a bank that is begirming to open outlets to serve the unbanked and to the
CBO. Significantly, if the CBO is well respected and well cormected in the
community, it can help overcome any distrust that the community might
have of the bank's motives. This role is especially important if a bank's
managers and board of directors are separated from the target commimity
by racial or ethnic barriers. In many cases, the CBO can help the bank find
qualified community residents to staff the outlet, further tying the outlet to
the commimity. The CBO also benefits from the partnership because it
enables the CBO to bring sophisticated financial services to the targeted
neighborhood in a short time period. Some CBOs have tried, as an alter
native strategy, to start their own credit unions. Most of these credit unions,
however, remain very small with limited management capacity and can
offer only a very restricted range of consumer financial products.
In addition to forming a partnership with a CBO to launch outlets to serve
the imbanked, banks should use the outlets as bases to promote appropriate
financial literacy initiatives. Although there are no random assignment
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studies demonstrating the effectiveness of financial literacy programs, anec
dotal information and some quasi-experimental studies suggest that finan
cial management counseling can help individuals accumulate savings and
improve their credit-risk profiles (Braimstein and Welch, 2002). Typically,
the educational programs are one of two types. One is remedial, focusing on
helping people reduce their debt service burdens and address outstanding
credit problems. The other type is oriented toward wealth-building activi
ties, such as identifying cost-savings in family budgets and accumulating
savings for retirement, education, or the purchase of a home.
This is not to say that the outlets should conduct such financial coxmseling programs themselves. Not only are such programs costly to offer,
but banks may not be the appropriate institutions to deliver the informa
tion. CBOs are likely to be more effective because well-run CBOs will
understand the particular financial literacy needs of members of their com
munities and have staff who can communicate comfortably and effectively
with them. In addition, as not-for-profit organizations, CBOs can apply to
philanthropic fovmdations and government agencies to fund their financial
coimseling programs.
WHY IT IS REALISTIC TO EXPEQ BANKS TO IMPLEMENT
THE PROPOSED OUTREACH STRATEGY

If banks are to implement this outreach strategy, they must receive an accept
able financial rate of return on their investment. As delivering financial ser
vices to lower-income communities counts towards bairks' Commimity
Reinvestment Act obligations, banks may accept a slightly lower return on
capital than normal. Naturally, the higher the expected returns from pursu
ing the outreach strategy are, the more likely banks will be to embrace it.
There are a number of measures that banks can take to ensure that they
earn an adequate rate of return from their outlets. To keep their operating
costs low, the outlets should have flexible staffing because demand for
check-cashing services is closely tied to the paydays of local businesses and
arrival dates for government transfer payments. In addition, the outlets
should be small, perhaps taking no more than 1,000 square feet, as many
check-cashing outlets do. Banks might also investigate using automated
check-cashing machines to cash paychecks, dispense money orders, and
initiate utility bill payments within the outlets. Several such machines have
been developed, based aroimd ATM platforms, and some preliminary
reports of their performance and customer acceptance are favorable.
Well-located outlets should have strong revenues. Assuming that they
attract a moderately high volume of check-cashing business and levy rea
sonable check-cashing fees in the neighborhood of 1.5 percent, the outlets
should earn about $100,000 per year from check-cashing and other pay
ment service fees.^ In addition to this income, the outlets will earn income
from their traditional banking services. If these two businesses can be com-
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bined in one outlet with substantial economies of scope, the outlets should
be at least moderately profitable.
Reinforcing my argument that it is realistic to expect banks to implement
all or many elements of this general approach, a small number of deposit
institutions have already begim to do so. The pioneer in this regard is Union
Bank of California (UBC). In 1993, UBC, a bank that currently has about
$40 billion in assets, created "Cash & Save" outlets to offer check-cashing
services and banking services in the same location.® Since that time, the
structure and operations of these outlets have changed, and they will likely
continue to change as UBC refines its initiative. As of early 2003, UBC had
thirteen Cash & Save outlets, mostly located in Los Angeles and San Diego.
In addition to providing traditional consumer banking services, the
Cash & Save outlets provide the full range of commercial check-cashing
outlet services. They cash government checks and paychecks for non
depositors. The check-cashing fee is 1.5 percent of the face value of paychecks and 1.0 percent for government benefit checks. The outlets sell
money orders (with stamped envelopes), originate domestic and inter
national wire transfers of funds, handle the payment of utility bills, sell pre
paid phone cards, provide fax and photocopying services, and in some
locations sell bus tokens and passes.
Through its Cash & Save outlets, UBC offers ETAs; low-cost, lowminimum-balance checking accoimts; and low-cost, low-minimum-balance
savings accounts. The Cash & Save outlets also offer two plans to help
check-cashing customers build savings. The first is the "Nest Egg" savings
account. One can open this accoimt with as little as a $10 deposit, but the
account holder must also commit to depositing at least $25 per month for
one year. The account does not include access to an ATM card, and it is not
intended as a transaction account. Anyone can open this account, even peo
ple with a history of writing bad checks or with severely impaired credit
records. Account holders pay no fees for the account, and they receive a
passbook interest rate on their savings. They cannot withdraw fxmds from
the account until the end of the year, but the bank, at its discretion, does
allow some emergency withdrawals. An account holder can close the
account at any time. The second savings-building accoimt is the "Combo"
account. This is the Nest Egg accoimt combined with the bank's Money
Order Plan. To open a Combo account, one must deposit at least $10 in a
Nest Egg account and commit to depositing at least $25 per month into the
account for one year. As a Combo account holder, one pays a 1.0 percent
check-cashing fee and receives six free money orders each month.
The other approach that banks have taken to combine check-cashing
and consumer banking services is to partner with existing check-cashing
operations. This approach has much lower start-up and learning costs for
the banks, but also limits the range of banking services that can be deliv
ered through CCOs. In early 2000, UBC entered into a joint venture with
Nix Check Cashing, a firm with numerous CCOs in Southern California. In
this initiative, UBC placed ATM machines, capable of taking deposits as
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well as dispensing cash, inside thirty of Nix's CCOs. It also placed tele
phones with direct connections to a UBC representative in the CCOs. Using
the telephone connection and assistance from a CCO teller, a customer can
open a UBC deposit account or complete a loan application. In New York
in early 2001, a small credit union, Bethex Federal Credit Union, which
serves a predominantly low-income population, formed a partnership
with a commercial check-cashing firm, RiteCheck Check Cashing. With its
11 CCO outlets, RiteCheck refers to Bethex its customers who might wish
to open a deposit account or to take out a small loan. RiteCheck will cash
the paychecks of Bethex members for a fee that is somewhat lower than its
normal fee. Bethex, in turn, pays RiteCheck a small transaction fee so its
members can, without charge, deposit checks at a RiteCheck outlet or
obtain cash from their Bethex accounts (Stegman and Lobenhofer, 2001).
Effectively, the RiteCheck outlets function as limited service branches for
the credit union. Another New York credit union. Actors Federal Credit
Union, has recently initiated a similar partnership with a second check
cashing firm, Manhattan Money Branch. In addition, Bethex, RiteCheck,
and others have been working to implement a system that would enable
any check-casher that participates in a three-state, regional ATM-type net
work, known as Paynet, to provide basic payment services to the members
of participating credit unions.

CONCLUSION
>

This chapter proposes a strategy for bringing the unbanked into the bank
ing system. I fully acknowledge that even if this strategy were widely imple
mented, it would not reach all of the unbanked. Nor would it succeed m
helping all those it does reach to build savings, improve credit histories, or
lower the cost of their financial services. Nevertheless, with over 10 million
unbanked households in the United States, even a modest rate of success
could mean significant improvements in the quality of life for himdreds of
thousands of lower-income families.

NOTES
1. Throughout this chapter, I use the term "bank" in its generic sense, meaning
that it includes commercial banks, saving banks, savings and loans, and credit
unions.
2. In the survey, respondents were allowed to give more than one reason.
3. As indicated in the report by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (2000), in 1999, all banks imposed fees for writing a check with insufficient
funds to cover it. In that year, the average fee was $17.71. As banks generally also
charge a fee to businesses that deposit such checks (the average fee in 1999 was
$6.28), merchants will commonly impose a charge (usually $10 to $15) on customers
who write checks that bounce.
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4. As indicated in table 8.4, among unbanked lower-income households, only
14 percent carry a major credit card. Among lower-income households with deposit
accounts, 59 percent do. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances are similar (as
cited in Hogarth and O'Donnell, 1999).
5. Banks entering the check-cashing business should employ the standard soft
ware and operating procedures marketed to check-cashing outlets. These have
been carefully refined over many years to speed check-cashing and related trans
actions, while minimizing fraud and the risk of cashing checks that boimce. Using
standard software and operating procedures, most check-cashing transactions take
less than one minute. CCOs that employ these procedures and that cash mainly
payroll checks and government checks report that losses from cashing "bad"
checks amount to well imder 0.25 percent of the face value of the checks they cash.
6. Stegman (1999) provides an excellent discussion of the economics and politics
behind the development of ETAs and a more detailed description of their features.
7. The largest publicly traded check-cashing firm is ACE Cash Express, Inc. Its
2002 SEC 10-K filing indicates that a mature store's annual revenues from checkcashing fees total about $130,000. Its revenues from bill payments, money transfers,
and money order sales total about $30,000. ACE's typical fee for cashing a check is
2.2 percent of the face value of the check.
8.1 thank Yolanda Scott Brown of Union Bank of California for the description
of the operations of the Cash & Save outlets.
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